On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information

Maarten C.W. Janssen () and Emiel Maasland ()
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Maarten C.W. Janssen: Erasmus University Rotterdam

No 97-073/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This note studies a version of the Stackelberg model in which the Leader has more information about demand than the Follower. We show that there exists a unique D1 equilibrium and that this equilibrium is perfectly revealing. We also give a full characterization of the equilibrium in terms of the posterior beliefs of the Follower and show under which condition there is first mover disadvantage.

Date: 1997-07-03

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Working Paper: On the unique d1 equilibrium in the Stackelberg model with asymmetric information (1997)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:uvatin:19970073

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