Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims

Simon Gächter () and Arno Riedl

No 03-055/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in international conflicts, and welfare state reforms bargainers hold strong entitlements that are often generated by claims that are not feasible any more. These entitlements seem to considerably shape negotiation behavior. By using the novel setup of a 'bargaining with claims' experiment we provide new systematic evidence tracking the influence of entitlements and obligations through the whole bargaining process. We find strong entitlement effects that shape opening offers, bargaining duration, concessions and reached (dis-)agreements. We argue that entitlements constitute a 'moral property right' that is influential independent of negotiators' legal property rights.

Keywords: A12; D63; C78; C92. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06-18
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20030055

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