Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game reconsidered

Wolfgang J. Luhan (), Martin Georg Kocher () and Matthias Sutter ()

No 06-099/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: While most papers on team decision-making find teams to behave more selfish, less trusting and less altruistic than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by letting subjects make individual as well as team decisions in an experimental dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest influence on team decisions. Various sources of the different findings in Cason and Mui (1997) and in our paper are discussed.

Keywords: experiment; dictator game; team behavior; social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pol
Date: 2006-11-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered (2007)
Journal Article: Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060099

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