Tournament Incentives in The Field: Gender Differences in The Workplace

Josse Delfgaauw (), Robert Dur (), Joeri Sol () and Willem Verbeke ()
Additional contact information
Joeri Sol: Erasmus University Rotterdam
Willem Verbeke: Erasmus University Rotterdam

No 09-069/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We ran a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain consisting of 128 stores. In a random sample of these stores, we introduced short-term sales competitions among subsets of stores. We find that sales competitions have a large effect on sales growth, but only in stores where the store's manager and a large fraction of the employees have the same gender. Remarkably, results are alike for sales competitions with and without monetary rewards, suggesting a high symbolic value of winning a tournament. Lastly, despite the substantial variation in team size, we find no evidence for free-riding.

Keywords: field experiment; gender differences; competition; sales contests; awards (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 J16 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-lab and nep-mic
Date: 2009-08-04

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Related works:
Working Paper: Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20090069

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