Going Once, Going Twice, Reported! Cartel Activity And The Effectiveness Of Leniency Programs in Experimental Auctions

Jeroen Hinloopen () and Sander Onderstal ()
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Jeroen Hinloopen: University of Amsterdam
Sander Onderstal: University of Amsterdam

No 09-085/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We experimentally examine the effectiveness of a leniency program against bidding rings in two

Keywords: Leniency Programs; Auctions; Cartels; Laboratory Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D44 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-exp and nep-ind
Date: 2009-10-09

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20090085

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