Manipulation comptable:les dirigeants et les autres parties prenantes

Gaetan Breton () and Alain Schatt ()
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Gaetan Breton: Université du Québec à Montréal

Working Papers FARGO from Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance)

Abstract: (VF)Dans cet article, nous avançons que les dirigeants, soucieux de maximiser la richesse des actionnaires, manipulent l'information comptable afin de transférer de la richesse de certaines parties prenantes vers les actionnaires. En particulier, la divulgation d'une image de situation financière différente de l'image fidèle permet aux dirigeants d'optimiser les bénéfices futurs, grâce à une réduction des coûts fiscaux, sociaux, et financiers et à une maximisation des revenus futurs.(VA) In this article, we argue that managers, following an objective of maximizing shareholders' wealth, manipulate accounting information to transfer wealth from other stakeholders to the benefit of shareholders. In particular, not presenting a true and fair view of the financial situation of the firm allows the managers to optimizing the future benefits through a reduction of fiscal, social and financing costs and a maximization of the future incomes.

Keywords: manipulation comptable; parties prenantes; transfert de richesse; earnings management; stakeholders; wealth transfer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 M40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-01

Published in La revue du financier, 2003, février.

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