L’évaluation des performances et le degré d’autonomie des acteurs locaux:le cas des banques de réseau - Performance measurement and allocation of decision rights:the case of retail banking

Christine Marsal

Working Papers FARGO from Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance)

Abstract: (VF)Le système d’évaluation des performances dans le secteur bancaire est encore peu étudié en France. Il existe peu d’informations sur l’Architecture Organisationnelle des banques de réseaux qui aujourd’hui, se targuent de pouvoir compter sur de solides réseaux bancaires pour garantir la solidité de leurs revenus. Comment sont pilotées les agences bancaires ? Existe-t-il des spécificités en fonction des droits décisionnels alloués au niveau local ? Cette étude empirique se propose de répondre à ces questions tout en tentant d’établir une typologie entre les banques mutualistes et les banques dites commerciales.(VA)The structure of the system to evaluate the performance in the banking sector is poorly studied in France. We don’t have a lot of informations about Organizational Architecture of retail banks although managers argue that branches are important to generate regular revenues. The questions are numerous: how are branches managed? Are the decision rights equally assigned in branches among the whole banking sector? And what’s about the specificity of mutual banks? The aim of this study is to answer these questions and try to elaborate a typology between mutual and commercial banks.

Keywords: architecture organisationnelle; indicateurs de performance; décentralisation; banques; organizational architecture; performance standards; decentralization; mutual banks; mutuelles. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D2 G2 G3 M4 M5 L3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban
Date: 2009-04
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