Stricter Enforcement May Increase Tax Evasion

Rainald Borck ()

No 297, Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pub and nep-reg
Date: Written 2002
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Journal Article: Stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion (2004)
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