Risk Aversion and Compliance in Markets for Pollution Control

John Kevin Stranlund

No 2006-2, Working Papers from University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of risk aversion on compliance choices in markets for pollution control. A firm’s decision to be compliant or not is independent of its manager’s risk preference. However, noncompliant firms with risk averse managers will have lower violations than otherwise identical firms with risk neutral managers. The violations of noncompliant firms with risk averse managers are independent of differences in their benefits from emissions and their initial allocations of permits if and only if their managers’ utility functions exhibit constant absolute risk aversion. However, firm-level characteristics do impact violation choices when managers have coefficients of absolute risk aversion that are increasing or decreasing in profit levels. Finally, in the equilibrium of a market for emissions rights with widespread noncompliance, risk aversion is associated with higher permit prices, better environmental quality, and lower aggregate violations.

Keywords: Emissions Trading; Compliance; Enforcement; Risk Aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-upt
Date: 2006-09
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://courses.umass.edu/resec/workingpapers/docum ... rkingpaper2006-2.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dre:wpaper:2006-2

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics
Series data maintained by Eileen Keegan ().