Majority voting with stochastic preferences: The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members

Pierre-Guillaume Méon

No 06-05.RS, Working Papers DULBEA from Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA)

Abstract: This note studies the volatility of the policy chosen by a committee whose members’ preferences are volatile, due to common and individual preferences shocks. It is shown that majority voting mitigates the latter but not the former. The volatility of the policy is smaller the smaller the volatility of members’ preferences, smaller the larger the size of the committee, and smaller than if it was chosen by a single member. The results hold in a context of uncertainty and with multidimensional issues.

Keywords: committee; majority voting; uncertainty; volatility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-cdm and nep-pol
Date: 2006-04
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Related works:
Working Paper: Majority voting with stochastic preferences: The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members (2004)
Journal Article: Majority voting with stochastic preferences: The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members (2006)
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