Hiring People-like-Yourself: A Representation of Discrimination on the Job Market

Ariane Szafarz

No 07-21.RS, Working Papers DULBEA from Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA)

Abstract: This paper offers a new representation of discrimination on the job market based on the most recent findings in the socio-psychological academic literature about human behaviour. Put it simply, it is assumed that the agents prefer working with people like themselves. This "affinity" principle is modelled through a distance between an individual (the candidate for a job) and the staff of the firm. Contrary to the classical view according to which discrimination results from asymmetric information, this new model provides a rationale for the presence of discriminative attitudes on the job market even when full information is available on the skill levels of all candidates for a working position.

Keywords: discrimination; affinity; skill. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J71 J70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-11
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Related works:
Working Paper: Hiring people-like-yourself: a representation of discrimination on the job market (2007)
Working Paper: Hiring people-like-yourself: a representation of discrimination on the job market (2007)
Working Paper: Hiring People-like-Yourself: A Representation of Discrimination on the Job Market (2007)
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