Rent-sharing under Different Bargaining Regimes:Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data

Michael Rusinek () and Francois Rycx ()

No 08-09.RS, Working Papers DULBEA from Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA)

Abstract: The authors of this paper use detailed linked employer-employee data from a 2003 survey in Belgium to examine how collective bargaining features affect the extent of rent-sharing. Their results show that there is substantially more rent-sharing in decentralized than in centralized industries, even when controlling for the endogeneity of profits, for heterogeneity among workers and firms and for differences in characteristics between bargaining regimes. Moreover, in centralized industries, rent-sharing is found only for workers that are covered by a firm agreement. Finally, results indicate that within decentralized industries, both firm and industry bargaining generate rent-sharing to the same extent.

Keywords: Rent-sharing; collective bargaining; propensity score matching. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-lab
Date: 2008-03
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Related works:
Working Paper: Rent-sharing under different bargaining regimes: Evidence from linked employer-employee data (2008)
Working Paper: Rent-sharing under Different Bargaining Regimes: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data (2009)
Working Paper: Rent-Sharing under Different Bargaining Regimes: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data (2008)
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