Are promises indebting? Political economy of electoral promises

Etienne Farvaque () and Gaël Lagadec

No 08-14.RS, DULBEA Working Papers from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: This article exposes the dynamics of electoral promises, building on an electoral competition model with endogenous policies. This framework allows to deal with the intertemporal dimension needed to understand the prevalent cycle of promises, disappointment, new promises, new disappointment

Keywords: Lobbies; Promises; Elections; Electoral competition; Lies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Published by:

Downloads: (external link)
https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/5414 ... l_wpaper_08-14rs.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to dipot.ulb.ac.be:443 (certificate verify failed)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dul:wpaper:08-14rs

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://hdl.handle.ne ... ulb.ac.be:2013/54148

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in DULBEA Working Papers from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Benoit Pauwels ().