Are promises indebting? Political economy of electoral promises

Etienne Farvaque () and Gaël Lagadec ()
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Gaël Lagadec: Université de Nouvelle-Calédonie

No 08-14.RS, Working Papers DULBEA from Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA)

Abstract: This article exposes the dynamics of electoral promises, building on an electoral competition model with endogenous policies. This framework allows to deal with the intertemporal dimension needed to understand the prevalent cycle of promises, disappointment, new promises, new disappointment

Keywords: Lobbies; Promises; Elections; Electoral competition; Lies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Date: 2008-06
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dul:wpaper:08-14rs

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