Thierry Foucault,
Ailsa RÖELL and
Patrik SANDAS Additional contact information Ailsa RÖELL: Princeton University, Postal: Princeton, NJ 08544
Patrik SANDAS: The Wharton School, Postal: University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104
Abstract:
We develop a model of price formation in a dealership market where monitoring of the information flow requires costly effort. The result is imperfect monitoring, which creates profit opportunities for speculators, who do not act as dealers but simply monitor the information flow and quote updates in order to pick off stale quotes. Externalities associated with monitoring can help to sustain non-competitive spreads. We show that protecting dealers against the execution of stale quotes can result in larger spreads and be detrimental to price discovery due to externalities in monitoring. A reduction in the minimum quoted depth will reduce the spread and speculators' trading frequency. Our analysis is relevant for the SOES debate given that the behavior of speculators in our model is very similar to the alleged behavior of the real world SOES bandits.
More papers in Les Cahiers de Recherche from HEC Paris Address: HEC Paris, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex, France Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Sandra Dupouy ().
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