Economic Incongruities in the European Patent System

Malwina Mejer () and Bruno van Potteslberghe de la Potterie
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie

No 2009_003, ECARES Working Papers from Université Libre de Bruxelles, Ecares

Abstract: This paper argues that the consequences of the ‘fragmentation’ of the European patent system are more dramatic than the mere prohibitive costs of maintaining a patent in force in many jurisdictions. First, detailed analysis of judicial systems in several European countries and four case studies provide evidence suggesting that heterogeneous national litigation costs, practices and outcome induce a high level of uncertainty. Second, a high degree of managerial complexity results from systemic incongruities due to easier ‘parallel imports’, possible ‘time paradoxes’ and the de facto paradox of having EU-level competition policy and granting authority ultimately facing national jurisdictional primacy on patent issues. These high degrees of uncertainty and complexity contribute to reduce the effectiveness of the European patent system and provide additional arguments in favour of the Community patent and a centralized litigation in Europe.

Keywords: European patent system; patent cost; litigation process; enforcement; uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K41 P14 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-law and nep-reg
Date: 2009
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http://www.ecares.org/index2.php?option=com_docman ... ew&gid=59&Itemid=204 First version, 2009 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Economic incongruities in the European patent system (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eca:wpaper:2009_003

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