EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries

Mark Hallerberg (), Rolf Strauch () and Juergen von Hagen ()
Additional contact information
Rolf Strauch: Corresponding author: European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/html/index.en.html

No 419, Working Paper Series from European Central Bank

Abstract: This paper examines the development of fiscal rules and budget procedures in EU countries, and their impact of public finances since the mid-1980s. It presents a new data set on institutional reforms and their impact in Europe. Empirical pattern confirm our prediction that more stringent fiscal rules exist under large coalition governments, while the centralisation of budgetary procedures is the main form of fiscal governance elsewhere. In addition, the centralisation of procedures does not restrain public debt in countries more prone to a rules-based approach, whereas more stringent fiscal rules seem to support fiscal discipline in almost all EU countries.

Keywords: Public indebtedness; budgetary procedures; fiscal rules; European public finances. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H61 H62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec and nep-pbe
Date: 2004-12
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp419.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries (2006) Downloads
Journal Article: The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries (2007) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20040419

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Press and Information Division, European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from European Central Bank
Address: Postfach 16 03 19, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Official Publications ().

 
Page updated 2009-12-03
Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20040419