Strategic vertical integration without foreclosure

Eric Avenel ()

No 11, Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 from Royal Economic Society

Abstract: We determine the endogenous degree of vertical integration in a model of successive oligopoly that captures both efficiency gains and strategic effects. We show that vertical merger waves can be expected to stop by themselves before integration is complete. Consequently, vertical foreclosure plays no significant role in this paper that claims for a soft approach of vertical integration by antitrust authorities.

Keywords: merger waves; vertical integration; vertical foreclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L22 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind
Date: 2003-06-04
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