Abstract:
In this paper we develop a formal model of the optimal financing of research projects, when the projects differ in both their success probability and the cost of undertaking. We show that in the benchmark case of publicly observable costs the first best can be achieved. If the costs are private information, however, the optimal contract will imply some inefficiency. We provide the first order characterization of the optimal financing scheme in this case and explicitly find it, assuming CARA utility for the institutions
Keywords:multidimensional; screening (search for similar items in EconPapers) JEL-codes:D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Date: Written 2004-08-11
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Related works: This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
More papers in Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings from Econometric Society Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().
This site is part of RePEc
and all the data displayed here is part of the RePEc data set.
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to
contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .