Coercion, Contract and the Limits of the Market

Kaushik Basu

No 355, Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: A central proposition on which much of normative economics is founded asserts that if two or more adults voluntarily agree to an exchange or trade and this does not have a negative fall-out on others, then government should not stop this exchange. Yet, on a variety of matters (hazardous work, the right to give up trade union rights in order to work in an export-processing zone) we tend to justify government or international interventions banning seemingly voluntary exchanges. This lecture will explore the meaning of coercion and voluntariness and try to articulate general principles for describing certain markets as 'obnoxious'. The principles will be applied to different labor market problems, ranging from sexual harassment to hazardous work.

Keywords: coercion; contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Coercion, Contract and the Limits of the Market (2006)
Journal Article: Coercion, contract and the limits of the market (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:ausm04:355

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings from Econometric Society
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().