Abstract:
In this paper, we consider the network as an alternative trading environment to the market. The main distinctive feature of the network transaction is the dependence of buyers' purchasing behavior, which makes all consumers not equally valuable to a seller. We characterize the optimal behavior of a seller and consumers in a network. A seller's strategy of paying referral fees can be understood as a way of price discrimination between more valuable consumers and less valuable ones. Numerical simulations demonstrate that the social network mau be either overutilized (if the referral cost is high) or underutilized (if the referral cost is low)
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Related works: Journal Article: A theory of consumer referral (2008) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
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