Voting Leaders and Voting Participation

Cesar Martinelli (), Helios Herrera and David K. Levine

No 319, Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: We model electoral competition between two parties in a winner take all election. Parties choose strategically first their platforms and then their campain spending under aggregate uncertainty about voters' preferences. In the unique Nash equilibrium larger elections are characterized by a higher participation rate. Moreover, no matter what the voters' preferences are, parties spend exactly the same amounts for their campain in equilibrium. Platforms converge to the center (median voter) and spending increases as the uncertainty over voters' preferences decreases.

Keywords: Voter's Paradox; Aggregate Uncertainty. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Date: 2004-08-11
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