Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon's Problem

Parimal Kanti Bag; Hamid Sabourian
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Hamid Sabourian and Parimal Bag

No 257, Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: We consider a multi-awards generalization of King Solomon's problem: $k$ identical and indivisible awards should be distributed among $n$ agents, $k1)$ prizes efficiently in subgame perfect equilibria without any monetary transfers in equilibrium. Finally, in the multi-awards case we relax the complete information assumption and achieve implementation of efficient allocation by iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, using a generalization of Olszewski's (2003) mechanism

Keywords: Solomon's problem; prizes; implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11

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Working Paper: Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon’s Problem (2004)
Journal Article: Distributing awards efficiently: More on King Solomon's problem (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:nasm04:257

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