Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games

Rajiv Vohra () and Roberto Serrano ()

No 519, Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience. Since information sharing is generally implicit in the equilibria of such voting games, this approach makes it possible to derive core concepts in which information sharing is endogenous. Our results lend support to credible core of Dutta and Vohra (2003) and the core proposed by Myerson (2003) as two that can be justified in terms of coalitional voting

Keywords: Core; Incomplete Information; Coalitional Voting; Resilience; Mediation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
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Related works:
Working Paper: INFORMATION TRANSMISSION IN COALITIONAL VOTING GAMES (2005)
Working Paper: Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games (2005)
Working Paper: Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games (2005)
Journal Article: Information transmission in coalitional voting games (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:nasm04:519

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