Returnable Goods: Refunds and Information Acquisition

Nicola Persico and Steven A. Matthews ()

No 537, Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: We present two information-based rationales for why sellers of returnable goods tend to offer refunds in excess of the salvage value of the good. Both explanations require at least the potential presence of consumers who can choose to learn their values for the good prior to purchasing.

Keywords: refunds; information acquisition; warranties; monopoly pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:nasm04:537

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