Constitutional Rules

Francesco Giovannoni and Toke S Aidt ()

No 540, Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: This paper proposes a normative theory of constitutional rules. We characterize the set of optimal constitutional rules under different assumptions about the degree of contractual imperfections. Our model explains why constitutions contain different types of rules. In particular, we derive conditions under which it is optimal, in addition to a standard decision rule (e.g., simple majority), to introduce veto rules (that block certain types of decisions) and supermajority rules (that allow the veto rule to be overruled). Our model also explains the existence of amendment rules and checks and balances

Keywords: Constitutions; constitutional design; social contracts; majority rules; amendments; checks and balances (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 D70 D (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:nasm04:540

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