Networks of Relations

Giancarlo Spagnolo and Steffen Lippert ()

No 496, Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: In this paper, we model networks of relational contracts. We explore sanctioning power within these networks under different information technologies depending on the shape of the network. The value of the relational network lies in the enforcement of cooperative agreements which would not be enforceable for the agents without access to the punishment power of other network members. We identify conditions for stability of such networks, conditions for transmission of information about past actions, and conditions under which self-sustainable subnetworks may actually inhibit a stable network

Keywords: Networks; Relational Contracts; Collusion; Social Capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L29 D23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
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Related works:
Working Paper: Networks of Relations (2004)
Working Paper: Networks of Relations (2005)
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