The Welfare Cost of Market Incompleteness: Opitmal Financial Contracts with Non-Enforceability Constraints

Thomas Cooley (), Ramon Marimon and Vincenzo Quadrini ()

No 1386, Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers from Econometric Society

Abstract: In this paper we develop a general equilibrium model in which firms finance investment by signing long-term contracts with a financial intermediary. Due to enforceability problems, financial contracts are constrained optimal, that is, they maximize the surplus of the contract subject to incentive compatibility constraints. By comparing this model with an alternative model in which contracts are fully enforceable, we evaluate the quantitative importance of non-enforceability for the aggregate allocation of the economy. We find that in the steady state the welfare level in the economy with enforceable contracts is 2.6 percent larger than in the economy with non-enforceable contracts.

Date: 2000-08-01

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Related works:
Working Paper: THE WELFARE COST OF MARKET INCOMPLETENESS: OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTS WITH NON-ENFORCEABILITY CONSTRAINTS (2000)
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