Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed Bid Auctions

Roberto Burguet and Martin Perry
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Martin Perry: Rutgers University

No 1827, Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers from Econometric Society

Abstract: No abstract.

Date: 2000-08-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed Bid Auctions (2002)
Journal Article: Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions (2007)
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