Strong Enforcement by a Weak Authority

Jakub Steiner ()

ESE Discussion Papers from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Abstract: This paper studies the enforcement abilities of authorities with a limited commitment to punishing violators. Commitment of resources su±cient to punish only one agent is needed to enforce high compliance of an arbitrary number of agents. Though existence of other, non-compliance equilibria is generally inevitable, there exist punishment rules suitable for a limited authority to assure that compliance prevails in the long run under stochastic evolution.

Keywords: Commitment; Enforcement; Punishment; Stochastic Evolution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D64 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-soc
Date: 2006-12
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edn:esedps:149

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