Matching and Sorting when Like Attracts Like

Simon Clark

ESE Discussion Papers from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Abstract: This paper examines a class of two-sided matching problems with non-transferable utility. Agents are horizontally differentiated, and each would prefer to be matched to a similar partner, i.e. "like attracts like". such preferences imply a unique equilibrium assignment describing the pattern of matching; however, the pattern of assortment in equilibrium is found to depend critically on the distribution of types among the two sexes. Classification-JEL: C7

Keywords: Matching; sorting; uniqueness; horizontal heterogeneity; marriage. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
Date: 2007-09-27

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edn:esedps:171

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