Moral Hazard and the Internal Organization of Joint Research

Simona Fabrizi () and Steffen Lippert ()

DFAEII Working Papers from University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II

Abstract: This paper analyzes the impact of agency problems on two entrepreneurs’ choice whether to carry out a stand-alone or a joint project. A joint project can be conducted by a single or both entrepreneurs’ research units, which are substitutes to a varying degree. Joint projects are chosen when they are of high value and/or for low degrees of duplication and complementarities between the units. Agency problems reduce the occurrence of joint projects as they have to be of higher value and/or exploit higher synergies. Joint projects making use of potential synergies are chosen too seldomly from a welfare standpoint.

Keywords: Agency problems; joint projects; internal organization; synergies. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D82 L24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06-28, Revised 2006-06-28
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Working Paper: Moral Hazard and the Internal Organization of Joint Research (2004)
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