A note on collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags

Aitor Ciarreta Antuñano () and Carlos Gutierrez-Hita ()

DFAEII Working Papers from University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II

Abstract: In this note we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms. We extend a previous note by Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006) [Colombo, L., and Labrecciosa, P., 2006. Optimal punishments with detection lags. Economic Letters 92, 198-201] to show how in the presence of detection lags optimal punish- ments fail to restore cooperation also in markets with a low number of firms.

Keywords: Optimal punishments; Detection lags; Collusion sustainability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mic
Date: 2008-09-05
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.dfaeii.ehu.es/s0044-con/en/contenidos/i ... juntos/wp2008-08.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:200808

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in DFAEII Working Papers from University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Cruz Angel Echevarria ().