Egalitarian distributions in coalitional models: The Lorenz criterion

Javier Arin ()

No 2003-02, IKERLANAK from Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I

Abstract: The paper presents a framework where the most important single-valued solutions in the literature of TU games are jointly analyzed. The paper also suggests that similar frameworks may be useful for other coalitional models.

Keywords: coalitional games; egalitarian criteria; prenucleolus; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Date: 2003-01
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehu:ikerla:200302

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Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain

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