An Approach to the stability of international environmental agreements: the absorbing sets solution

Norma Olaizola ()

No 2003-10, IKERLANAK from Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I

Abstract: We study international environmental negotiations when agreements between countries can not be binding. A problem with this kind of negotiations is that countries have incentives for free-riding from such agreements. We develope a notion of equilibrium based on the assumption that countries can create and dissolve agreements in their seeking of a larger welfare. This approach leads to a larger degree of cooperation compared to models based on the internal-external stability approach.

Keywords: international environmental agreements; absorbing sets solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 Q50 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-12
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Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain

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