Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations

Murali Agastia
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Murali Agastya ()

ELSE working papers from ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution

Abstract: We study the dual issues of allocation and coalition formation in a model of so-cial learning. For a class of economies which can be expressed in terms of a real valued char-acteristic function, we first show that all self-perpetuating (steady-state) allocations realized froma simple bargaining game must be core allocations although players make simultaneous demands for surplus and only on their own behalf. We also exhibit a a sufficient condition for global (probabilistic) convergence to the core.

Keywords: Bargaining; Learning; Characteristic Functions; Core. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations (1997)
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