Evolutive Equilibrium Selection I: Symmetric Two Player Binarychoice Games

Richard Vaughan

ELSE working papers from ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution

Abstract: The aim of the paper is the construction of a distributional model which enables the study of the evolutionary dynamics that arise for symmetric games, and the equilibrium selection mechanisms that originate from such processes. The evolution of probability distributions over the state variables is studied using the Fokker- Planck dif-fusion equation. Equilibrium selection using the "basin of attraction" approach, and a selection process suggested by Pontryagin are contrasted. Examples are provided for all generic 2-person symmetric binary choice games.

Keywords: Symmetric Games; Equilibrium Selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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