On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings

Ted Bergstrom ()

ELSE working papers from ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution

Abstract: This paper explores the evolutionary foundations of altruism among siblings and extends the biologists’ kin-selection theory to a richer class of games between relatives. We show that a population will resist invasion by dominant mutant genes if individuals maximize a ‘‘semi-Kantian’’ utility function in games with their siblings. It is shown that a population that resists invasion by dominant mutants may be invaded by recessive mutants. Conditions are found under which a population resists invasion by dominant and also by recessive mutants.

JEL-codes: C70 D10 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings (1995)
Working Paper: On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings
Journal Article: On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings (1995)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:els:esrcls:017

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