Learning, Matching and Aggregation

Ed Hopkins

ELSE working papers from ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution

Abstract: Fictitious play and "gradient" learning are examined in the context of a large population where agents are repeatedly randomly matched. We show that the aggregation of this learning behaviour can be qualitatively di®erent from learning at the level of the individual. This aggregate dynamic belongs to the same class of simply de

Keywords: Games; Fictitious Play; Learning; Evolution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Learning, Matching and Aggregation
Working Paper: Learning, Matching and Aggregation (1995)
Working Paper: Learning, Matching and Aggregation
Working Paper: Learning, Matching and Aggregation
Working Paper: Learning, Matching and Aggregation (1995)
Journal Article: Learning, Matching, and Aggregation (1999)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:els:esrcls:033

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