If the rationality hypothesis is interpreted in this way; it seems natural to ask next how well it does in practice. This will be discussed in Section III. I shall argue that the evidence is mixed. Economic agents typically act in some; but not in all situations rationally. This is shown both by experimental and by "real world" evidence. A question which then arises is what distinguishes situations in which agents behave rationally from those in which they don't. A central claim of this paper is that to find an answer to this question we need to do research on learning and evolution. This is because; to understand the distinction between situations in which agents do or do not behave rationally; one needs to understand the processes which bring about rationality; and learning processes and processes of evolution are among these processes. In Section IV I shall illustrate by means of examples how research on learning and evolution can illuminate empirical observations concerning the rationality of behaviour. The issue of rationality or irrationality of individuals' behaviour which I put at the centre of my argument is; however; not the issue on which the recent literature on learning and evolution has focused. Rather; it has given most attention to the problem of equilibrium selection in games. In Section V I shall suggest that this has been a mistake. I have three arguments for this.
First; the question of when rationality comes about logically precedes the question of equilibrium selection. Se-cond; from an empirical point of view; the question on which I suggest focusing is the more urgent question. Finally; the chances of making substantial progress with the equilibrium selection question appear to be relatively small as compared to the chances of making progress with the question on which I suggest focusing. Section V will contain a second point of criticism of the recent literature. It is that the literature has made too much use of evolutionary models taken from biology. If used in economics; such models must be interpreted as reduced forms of learning and imitation models. I shall argue that the most popular evolutionary models can indeed be interpreted in such a way; but that this interpretation relies on very special learning models. There are many other learning models which appear equally plausible; and which are not equivalent to biological models. The two criticisms of the recent literature on learning and evolution in Section V form the second step of the main argument of this paper. The paper is concluded with brief remarks in Section VI.">