Status and Incentives

Emmanuelle Auriol () and Régis Renault ()

No 2007-01, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: The paper introduces status as reflecting an agent's claim to recognition in her work. It is a scarce resource: increasing an agent's status requires that another agent's status is decreased. Higher status agents are more willing to exert effort in exchange for money; better-paid agents would exert a higher effort in exchange for an improved status. Results are coherent with actual management practices: (i) egalitarianism is desirable in a static context; (ii) in a long-term work relationship, juniors' compensations are delayed; past performances are recompensed by pay increases along with an improved status within the organization's hierarchy.

Keywords: repeated moral hazard; internal labor markets; social status (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L23 M12 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-lab
Date: 2007
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Related works:
Working Paper: Status and Incentives (2007)
Journal Article: Status and incentives (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2007-01

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