Information Congestion: open access in a two-sided market

Simon Anderson () and André de Palma ()

No 2007-10, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: Advertising messages compete for scarce attention. “Junk” mail, “spam” e-mail, and telemarketing calls need both parties to exert effort to generate transactions. Message recipients supply attention depending on average message benefit, while senders are motivated by profits. Costlier message transmission may improve message quality so more messages are examined. Too many messages may be sent, or the wrong ones. A Do-Not-Call policy beats a ban, but too many individuals opt out. A monopoly gatekeeper performs better than personal access pricing if nuisance costs to receivers are moderate.

Keywords: information overload; congestion; advertising; common property resource; two-sided markets; junk mail; email; telemarketing; Do Not Call List; message pricing policy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D60 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mic
Date: 2007
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.u-cergy.fr/thema/repec/2007-10.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2007-10

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Lise Patureau ().