Political Business Cycles through Lobbying

Marco Bonomo () and Cristina T. Terra ()

No 2008-18, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: In this paper we build a framework where the interplay between the lobby power of special interest groups and the voting power of the majority of the population leads to political business cycles. We apply our set up to explain electoral cycles in government expenditure composition as well as to cycles in aggregate expenditures and in real exchange rates.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mac and nep-pol
Date: 2008
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.u-cergy.fr/thema/repec/2008-18.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2008-18

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Lise Patureau ().