RENT BUILDING, RENT SHARING A PANEL COUNTRY-INDUSTRY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Paul Maarek (), Philippe Askenazy () and Gilbert Cette ()

No 2012-33, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: This paper aims to clarify the role of market regulations in rent creation and rent sharing. For each country-industry-year observation, the rent size (RS), measured by the value added price relative to the GDP price, is assumed to depend solely on direct anti-competitive regulations (ACR) on services and goods. The second step explains the rent sharing process by using the impact of our RS measure on the capital share. ACR on the good market increases rent size. RS increases the capital share but the magnitude highly depends on the bargaining power of the two alternative beneficiaries: workers and upstream industries.

Keywords: Rents; capital share; prices; market regulations; output gap; unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E25 J20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac
Date: 2012
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Related works:
Working Paper: Rent building, rent sharing - A panel country-industry empirical analysis (2012)
Working Paper: Rent Building, Rent Sharing: A Panel Country-Industry Empirical Analysis (2012)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2012-33

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