It’s Now or Never: Deadlines and cooperation

Kaz Miyagiwa ()

Emory Economics from Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta)

Abstract: Cooperation among opportunistic agents often breaks down when agents cannot observe one another’s actions. The standard remedy for such a problem is a two-mode approach pioneered by Green and Porter (1984), where agents switch back and forth between cooperation and punishment mode. Here, I consider use of a deadline as an alternative. I find that, under certain conditions, imposing a deadline can induce cooperation with unobservable actions, and that the optimal deadline can payoffdominates the optimal two-mode strategy.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2011-02
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:emo:wp2003:1101

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