 The agenda set by the EU Commission: the result of balanced or biased aggregation of positions?Miriam Hartlapp and Julia Metz and Christian Rauh No 1, Europe in Question Discussion Paper Series of the London School of Economics (LEQs) from London School of Economics / European Institute Abstract: Substantial theoretical and conceptual advances have been made with respect to agenda-setting as a determinant for policy outcomes. An actor-centred perspective on frames and venues is core to this literature, structure as a single standing category has received less attention. In this paper we argue that these results should be combined with bureaucratic politics in the European Commission to further our understanding of agenda setting processes in the European Union. Typically, a legislative proposal of the Commission is produced by a lead department which collaborates with a number of other departments on a partly formalized basis before a joint Commission decision is taken. Different services hold different positions on specific policies. We show that structures and rules governing the process yield the potential for some positions to be systematically more strongly represented in the proposals entering inter-institutional decision-making. We complement our argument by providing evidence of interaction patterns when it comes to internal coordination. New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cis and nep-eur Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:erp:leqsxx:p0021 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Europe in Question Discussion Paper Series of the London School of Economics (LEQs) from London School of Economics / European Institute |
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