Speeding up Bureaucrats by Greasing Them - An Experimental Study -

Luis Gonzalez, Werner Güth () and Maria Vittoria Levati ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: In the experiment two bureaucrats independently can grant a permit with the profit of the private party depending on when the permit is given. Whereas one bureaucrat can only veto the project, the second one has additional discretion in granting the permit earlier or later. We speak of greasing when the private party assigns a higher reward to the second bureaucrat. More specifically, the procedural rules are those of ultimatum bargaining with two responders of whom one can delay agreement. The experimental data suggest that greasing bureaucrats is moderately e±cient in speeding them up.

Keywords: Greasing; Ultimatum Game; Bureaucracy; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C92 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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