The Coevolution of Morality and Legal Institutions - An indirect evolutionary approach -

Werner Güth () and Axel Ockenfels

Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: Evolutionary game theory is often used to analyze the evolution of moral preferences. A few studies also examine the coevolution of preferences and an institutional aspect of the decision environment. Allowing the adaptation of just one institutional aspect such as litigation or legal insurance to coevolve with morality, however, may be inadequate. If court rulings coevolve with morality the need for legal insurance may vary over time. Applying the indirect evolutionary approach, we therefore analyze the coevolution of morality in the sense of trustworthiness, court rulings (based on rational belief formation), and the population share which is legally insured. If type detection is not possible, the evolutionary interaction of the legal institutions may play a decisive role for the emergence of morality.

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Related works:
Journal Article: The coevolution of morality and legal institutions: an indirect evolutionary approach (2005)
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