Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people? - An Experimental Analysis

Max Albert (), Werner Güth (), Erich Kirchler and Boris Maciejovsky

Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: We experimentally investigate whether individuals can reliably detect cooperators in an anonymous decision environment by allowing participants to condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoner's dilemma and a trust game (i) on their partner's donation share to a self-selected charity, and (ii) on whether their partner belongs to a group with high or low average donations (group affiliation). We find that high donators achieve a higher-than-average expected payoff by cooperating predominantly with other high donators. The group affiliation proved to be irrelevant.

Keywords: Game theory; Condidional Cooperation; Donation behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C73 D3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Date: 2002-05
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