Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games - An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis -

Werner Güth () and Stefan Napel ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: The indirect evolutionary approach integrates forward-looking evaluation of opportunities and adaptation in the light of the past. Subjective motivation determines behavior, but long-run evolutionary success of motivational types depends on objective factors only. This can justify intrinsic aversion to inequality in reward allocation games, though earlier analysis has typically been restricted to a particular game. We consider a more complex environment by combining two games that – studied in isolation – yield opposite implications for inequality aversion. Persistent divergence between intrinsic motivation and true material success is possible. It depends in the type of inequality aversion considered and, importantly, agents’ ability to discriminate between the qualitatively different games they face.

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Journal Article: Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games - An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis (2006)
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