Asymmetric Auction Experiments With(out) Commonly Known Beliefs

Werner Güth () and Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational.

Keywords: Sealed Bid Auctions; Asymmetric Bidders; Private-Independent Values; Beliefs; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)

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Journal Article: Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs (2003)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:discus:2002-36

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